The global debt burden has proven to be a bad bargain for developed and developing countries alike. This selection of case studies illustrates the complexity of international financial negotiations and the difficulty of reaching international agreements satisfactory to both creditors and debtors. The key aspects of debtor country bargaining power are explored-size, strategic significance, internal cohesion, and political stability-as we read of creditors flexing their financial muscles to produce domestic economic reform without significant international debt relief. This volume brings together a theoretical overview of the subject, cases describing the principal institutional actors, carefully excerpted cases of bilateral financial negotiations, sugggestions for further reading, and a helpful glossary of technical terms. It illuminates how complex international financial negotiations are conducted and what their impact is on both the domestic political economy and the international relations of the countries involved.
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